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At a time when the study of the theological underpinnings of political thought is 
gaining ground, Alison McQueen’s new book is good news. As McQueen reminds us, 
political theorists often pass over the fact that half of Hobbes’ Leviathan is a treatise 
on eschatology and ecclesiastical governance, or that Machiavelli concludes the 
Prince with a prophetic exhortation for the salvation of Italy from the ‘barbarians’ 
who periodically invaded it. Even a secularist like Morgenthau could not escape the 
allure of religious imagery in his most existentialist moments. McQueen’s fascinating 
book is due credit both for bringing these associations to the fore, thus joining the 
chorus of the ‘theological turn’ in political theory, and for forensically excavating the 
complex engagement of some of the doyens of realist thought with the symbolic 
resources provided by theological ideas and texts.  
 
In this meticulously argued study, McQueen investigates how well the realist 
credentials of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau fare against the challenge 
presented by the ‘apocalyptic imaginary’, which she takes to be the dominant cultural 
reservoir of ideas, symbols and images saturating the Renaissance and early modern 
Zeitgeist, up to its revamping in the nuclear era. McQueen is aware that examining 
these three thinkers jointly as part of a ‘realist tradition’ may expose her to criticisms 
from Cambridge School historians for ‘overzealous doctrine-hunting and tradition-
building’ (p. 17). Yet, her interpretive path aims to transcend the opposition between 
Cambridge School contextualism and the traditional history of ideas. Although she 
unequivocally assumes that it makes sense to talk about a relatively ‘coherent realist 
tradition’ that persists through time, she offers a careful contextual reading of her 
book’s three protagonists. For her, the realist sensibility can be summarized in three 
key ideas: politics as a tragic conflict between competing, potentially 
incommensurable, values; a cyclical, anti-teleological understanding of political time; 
and an appreciation of the contingency that governs political life. Having defined 
realism as an almost neo-pagan, passive nihilist doctrine (largely following Gray, 
Williams, and Guess), she then juxtaposes it with the apocalyptic imagination. She 
reconstructs the latter as the dualistic worldview announcing the cataclysmic and 
imminent destruction of the current world in anticipation of a ‘new age’ of bliss and 
prosperity. Apocalypticism, in a sense, is a theodicy that ruptures history from a 
transcendent outside, ‘a revelatory moment around which the past is given meaning 
and a radically new future is announced’ (p. 56, emphasis in the original).     
 
In the next three chapters on Machiavelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau, McQueen 
exemplifies what she takes to be the two main strategies of the realist response to the 
apocalyptic imaginary: rejection and redirection. Primarily anti-utopian thinkers, the 
realists are fundamentally suspicious of religious eschatological fervor run amok. 
Simultaneously, however, they resist the path of cynicism and despair that a complete 
abandonment of a concern for hope and meaning in the world would entail. McQueen 
reads the realists as being caught in this perennial dilemma, oscillating between these 
two options: either taming the destructive effects of the apocalyptic imaginary or 




destructive potential. Machiavelli exemplifies such an ambivalence in his qualified 
rejection of the Savonarolan apocalyptic moment. McQueen superbly demonstrates 
how Machiavelli’s political theological project makes him hard to classify. His 
engagement with theological tropes reveals how his republicanism and tragic realism 
is a constant struggle to reconcile tragic failure in politics with the necessity of hope. 
The prophetic tenor of the last chapter of the Prince and the moral realism of his 
Discourses should be read, McQueen argues, as signs of his failure ‘to make an 
unruly politics intelligible and therefore susceptible to princely mastery’ (p. 104). 
Perhaps unbeknownst to her, the implication here seems to be that realism’s failure, 
far from confirming the impossibility of a world without politics, as she declares, 
rather lays bare the futility of the politics of mastery or, put differently, politics as the 
liminal struggle with the inevitability of its own failure. 
 
The chapter on Hobbes is equally captivating although driven by a specific 
understanding of katechontic eschatology as a conservative device employed to 
prevent apocalyptic chaos. For McQueen, Hobbes conjures up the horrors of the state 
of nature and civil war as a secular apocalyptic scenario that seeks to instill fear in the 
hearts and minds of the Sovereign’s subjects. McQueen here reads Hobbes’ 
alternative Christian eschatology that seeks to denounce the fanaticism of false 
prophets and control religious enthusiasm as aligned with what she interprets as the 
legitimist eschatologies of Paul and Augustine. She thinks that the two serve the same 
purpose, the only difference being that Hobbes entrusts the role of the restrainer 
(katechon) not to the Church as the embodiment of Christ, but rather to the secular 
state with the Sovereign performing a Christ-like role. It is a vision of reversed 
redemption that employs apocalyptic terror to secure order and obedience until the 
Parousia. Hobbes’ secular eschatology could indeed be read as fulfilling such a 
function. However, I would hardly describe such an attitude as Pauline or 
Augustinian, unless one dilutes the meaning and scope of eschatology – traditional as 
well as in its twentieth-century revival – by obscuring the fact that it has primarily 
been a theological discourse of hope and indictment/judgement of the powers that be. 
Whenever the dilemma is between eschatology either as a quietist subordination to the 
right authority or as degeneration into apocalyptic revolutionism, then the genuinely 
political dimension of eschatology is lost.1  
 
Apocalypticism with its dualism of a corrupt world vs. a redeemed humanity, and its 
anticipation of a frictionless future brought about by a transcendent act of divine 
intervention is indeed antipolitical in its orientation and post-political in its 
expectations. Yet, the eschatological wager is not necessarily between some passively 
nihilistic tragic sensibility and apocalyptic destruction/transformation, as McQueen 
seems to think. The consensus among critical biblical scholars is that both Paul and 
Augustine have a more dynamic eschatology in mind, which stresses equally the 
sanctification of worldly existence after the resurrection (the already) and the 
anticipation of this transformative process’s completion (the not yet). Such an 
eschatology is distinctly anti-apocalyptic without simultaneously falling prey to tragic 
scepticism or resignation. For instance, Jürgen Moltmann’s and Johannes Baptist 
Metz’s twentieth-century political theologies are inspired by such an eschatological 






Machiavelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau may not be the best candidates to exemplify 
such a sensibility. Especially in Morgenthau’s case, McQueen is probably right to 
argue that Morgenthau’s theorizing ‘under an empty sky’ leaves him with no choice 
but to conjure the prospect of nuclear annihilation as a perverse politics of hope 
through destruction.2 Yet, realist political theology is not necessarily exhausted by 
those options. Paul and Augustine have also been the inspiration behind Christian 
realism – the elephant in the room in McQueen’s book representing a variant of 
twentieth-century realist thought that actively sought to transcend the 
tragedy/apocalypse false opposition. There is no space here to elaborate on this point, 
but the titles of Reinhold Niebuhr’s 1937 and 1949 books, Beyond Tragedy and Faith 
and History respectively, are telling of this ‘third’ way I am alluding to here: a 
treatment of eschatology that not only serves to tame or manipulate apocalyptic 
exaltation (status quo/katechontic function), but also to keep the hope of salvation 
alive and God mystically present in history as an indictment to worldly idols, such as 
the state, the nation, or the people (critical/anti-katechontic function). Machiavelli, 
Hobbes and Morgenthau are not Christian realists and their humanist secular 
eschatologies are made up only of fragments of theological tropes. But the realist 
ambivalence between scepticism and hope may well be a distant echo of such a 
fragmented eschatological sensibility. One interpretive possibility, then, that 
McQueen could have considered is that the realist attitude is not necessarily 
tortuously ambivalent between tragedy and apocalypse; rather, it rejects these two 
extremes in favour of a politics of qualified hope. Acknowledging this may then better 
explain why Machiavelli assumes a prophetic tone in the last chapter of the Prince or 
why Hobbes and Morgenthau are suspicious of utopian schemes of progress in 
politics, without thereby equating their anti-utopianism with a renunciation of the 
irrepressible role hope plays in politics.   
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1 Indeed, recently Agamben (2015) has criticised the Hobbesian katechontic eschatology as a betrayal 
of true eschatology. Building on the revival of eschatology in the twentieth century (Troeltsch, Metz, 
Moltmann, von Balthasar), Agamben recruits the critical function of eschatology against the 
perpetuation of the economic governance of things in modern biopolitics, which he identifies with 
‘hell’.    
2 McQueen’s chapter on Morgenthau, while intriguing, relies somewhat uncritically on Nicholas 
Guilhot’s overstated depiction of Morgenthau as a reactionary modernist disciple of Carl Schmitt. 
Apart from William Scheuerman and Michael Williams, both of whom she cites, McQueen neglects a 
host of other Morgenthau specialists (e.g. Richard Ned Lebow, Hartmut Behr, Felix Rösch, Muriel 
Cozette, Vibeke Tjalve, Sean Molloy, Mihaela Neacșu), who emphasise Morgenthau’s personal dislike 
for Schmitt as well as his intellectual disagreements with Schmitt’s conservatism. Having contributed 
to this literature, I would take McQueen’s only slightly qualified adoption of Guilhot’s minority view 
with reservations. 
